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Abstract 
 
For countries assessing whether to implement a cash transfer program, an ex-ante 
evaluation is vital to assess its potential impacts. This study simulates the impact of 
alternative cash transfer programs on school attendance and poverty among Sri Lankan 
children. We find that cash transfer programs targeting poor children would be the 
most cost-effective way to reduce child poverty and encourage school attendance. If 
means-testing is not feasible, then programs targeting the children in households with 
at least three school-age children would provide a suitable second-best solution. Our 
findings suggest that even a limited program budget can provide significant impacts.  
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Introduction  
Children constitute a particularly vulnerable group in developing and emerging market 
countries. As estimated by UNICEF (2000), the risk of income-poverty among children 
is high and children account for the majority of the poor. Hence, a growing consensus 
exists for the importance of addressing childhood poverty. According to the UN (2009), 
in Sri Lanka, currently, children (age under 15) account for approximately 25 per cent 
of the population. Those attending school account for 16 per cent. As a rapidly ageing 
economy in the South Asian region, the percentage of children in Sri Lanka is 
decreasing gradually over time while the elderly (aged 60 and above) population grows. 
Researchers in the field of social protection have tended to focus on old-age social 
security systems and their impact on poverty among the elderly in Sri Lanka. Social 
protection economists have paid relatively less attention to social security systems for 
enhancing the well-being of children in Sri Lanka.  
Universal primary school enrolment and completion is a Millennium Development Goal 
[MDG] of central importance to child welfare (World Bank, 2005). The goal is to 
ensure that by 2015, all children in the primary school-age group (age 5-9) are enrolled 
in the education system. Currently, approximately 10 per cent of children aged 5-9 in 
Sri Lanka do not attend school, and this percentage has been fairly constant since 
1995/1996. As for secondary schooling, the Sri Lankan secondary school gross 
enrolment ratio was 87.2 per cent in 2004 (UNESCO, 2008). According to the World 
Bank (2005), the majority of children who do not enrol in basic education are living in 
socio-economically disadvantaged circumstances either in rural areas or in low income 
urban neighbourhoods. As further evidence, Arunatilake (2006) explains that private 
spending on education is quite high in spite of large sums of government spending on 
in-kind transfer programs aimed at children, including free text book provision, free 
uniforms, and transportation subsidies. As a result, poor families still face a difficult 
situation in sending their children to school. Nevertheless, the feasibility for and the 
impact of cash transfer programs have not yet been tested for Sri Lanka from the point 
of view of poverty and school  attendance among children. This study provides an ex-
ante assessment for the role of unconditional cash transfer programs in alleviating child 
and household poverty and encouraging school attendance among Sri Lankan children 
for a variety of targeting criteria and transfer amounts.  
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We find that simple cash transfer programs implemented even with a limited budget 
could reduce child poverty significantly while increasing school attendance and child-
welfare modestly. Targeting poor children would be the most effective approach, 
though the involved administrative process for doing this is potentially cumbersome. If 
targeting poor children is too difficult, then targeting children in households with at 
least three children of school-age would provide a suitable alternative. These findings 
will assist policy makers to understand the costs and impacts of various cash transfer 
programs.  
 
Review of the Literature 
Most countries target poverty reduction with a mix of cash and in-kind transfers, but 
governments in developing and transition economies are increasingly relying on cash 
transfer programs to tackle childhood poverty (Barrientos and Dejong, 2004). There are 
a number of advantages for cash transfers when compared to in-kind transfers. 
Beneficiary families are free to use cash transfers in order to accomplish their priorities. 
Moreover, market distortions created by cash transfer programs are negligible. Such 
programs also tend to have multiplier effects on the local economy when the households 
spend their receipts. Tabor (2002) argues that the administrative setting required for 
handling cash transfer programs can be managed with low expenses. However, the 
effectiveness of such programs will depend completely on how poor households 
manage their money and how their behaviour changes in response to the program. Cash 
transfers may generate moral hazards.  
Cash transfer programs aimed at children take three potential forms, namely conditional 
cash transfer programs, unconditional cash transfer programs, and child benefits 
(UNICEF, 2009). Conditional cash transfer programs are considered to be regular 
income transfers to poor households meeting certain behavioural conditions, such as 
school attendance, health checkups, and so forth. In contrast, unconditional cash 
transfers benefit households by providing regular income transfers without any attached 
conditions. Finally, child benefits are given to households with children on a universal 
basis.  
Cash transfer programs are aimed at children with a view toward achieving several 
objectives (ILO, 2000; Foster and Toth, 2001). Vital among them are preventing 
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poverty among families with children, discouraging child labour, and encouraging 
school attendance. In addition, developing economies expect to improve gender equality 
by supporting investment in the human capital of girls, ensure a measure of parity 
between families with children and those without children, and further encourage 
fertility.  
Conditional cash transfer programs have been able to reduce poverty and generate 
positive impacts on school attendance, especially in Latin American countries (Son and 
Florentino, 2008). Well-recognized programs of this kind include Progresa (now called 
Opportunidades) in Mexico, Bolsa Escola and Bolsa familia in Brazil, Red de 
Proteccion Social in Nicaragua, Programa de Asistencia Familiar in Honduras, 
Program of Advancement Through Health and Education in Jamaica, Food for 
Education in Bangladesh, Subsido Unico Familiar in Chile, and the Pantamid 
Pamilyang Pilipino in the Philippines.  
A number of studies use an ex-ante simulation approach to evaluate the impact of cash 
transfer programs on child poverty and school attendance. As simulated by UNICEF 
(2009) for West and Central African countries, a universal child benefit scheme which 
provides a transfer equivalent to 30 per cent of the poverty line to every child from 0-14 
has the greatest impact on poverty among children. It reduces the child poverty 
headcount ratio by 27.6 per cent in Mali, 18.5 per cent in Congo, and 16.9 per cent in 
Senegal. Moreover, the simulation results show that this scheme reduces educational 
deprivation, measured in terms of the number of children aged six and above who do 
not attend school, by 2.9 per cent.  
According to Kakwani et al. (2006), in order to reduce the poverty headcount ratio in 
Sub-Saharan African countries, cash transfers have to be sizeable, in the range of 2 to 8 
per cent of GDP for these countries. Analyzing further, they argue that a bigger impact 
on poverty and school attendance could be achieved by making cash transfers targeted 
and conditional. Hence, conditionality and targeting play an important role in achieving 
the intended outcomes from cash transfer programs. Nevertheless, such a positive 
impact would be mitigated by the administrative cost of detailed targeting. Furthermore, 
they have shown that conditionality would have to be introduced in order to increase the 
school attendance of children.  
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As for targeting, Bourguignon et al. (2002) simulate the impact of the Bolsa Escola 
program in Brazil using universal targeting and targeting only poor children. The study 
reveals that targeting only poor children would be more effective in terms of 
encouraging school attendance and reducing poverty among children. The same 
conclusion is derived by Son and Florentino (2008) with regard to the Philippines. 
   
Methodology 
This study is based on the Sri Lanka Household Income and Expenditure Survey [Sri 
Lanka HIES] 2006/2007 conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics [DCS]. 
More details about the dataset are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
Determining the Poverty Status of Children 
This study utilizes static micro simulation techniques to simulate the impact of 
unconditional cash transfer programs on poverty and school attendance among children 
in Sri Lanka. Poverty in Sri Lanka is defined at the household level, and children living 
in poor households are classified as poor in this study. Under the official measure in Sri 
Lanka, poverty is defined as when the per-capita expenditures (total monthly 
expenditures divided by the number of household members with equal weights for 
adults and children) of a household fall below the poverty line of their residing district. 
The impact on poverty is estimated with the popular Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) 
generalized measures [FGT Poverty Measures], which combine information about the 
extent of poverty as measured by the poverty headcount ratio, the intensity of poverty as 
measured by the poverty gap, and the inequality among the poor as measured by the 
poverty severity. Further details about poverty measurements in Sri Lanka and the FGT 
Poverty Measures are provided in Appendix 2. 
  
The Role of Cash Transfers in School Attendance  
We adapt the methodology of Kakwani et al. (2005) to express the demand function for 
education as ],,[ icipicici SS ΗΖΖ=  where  ciS  is the demand for education for each 
child and icipi ΗΖΖ  and ,, are the vectors of characteristics of the household head, child, 
and household, respectively. More generally, piΖ  consists of the age, gender, and 
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education level of the household head. We also include the employment status of the 
household head, as is done in Arunatilake (2006). The vector 
ciΖ includes the child’s 
age, gender, and ethnicity. We also account for the biological relationship between the 
household head and the child, as Khanam and Ross (2005) find this to be an important 
factor. The household characteristics in the vector iΗ  include per-capita expenditures, 
sector (whether the household is in a rural or urban area), main livelihood (whether it is 
agriculture or non-agriculture), and the number of elderly dependents and children in 
the household. We estimate this demand function with a probit regression model to find 
the determinants of school attendance, seeking in particular to know the marginal effect 
of the household's per capita expenditures.  
With these estimated marginal effects, we create two indicators to simulate the impact 
on schooling of a change in per-capita expenditure triggered by the cash transfer 
program. These indicators include the percentage change in probability to attend school 
by children in cash-recipient families, and the estimated number of new student enrolees 
after the program as a percentage of total school-attending children. The latter is 
referred to as the percentage increase in school attendance at the national level. Since 
the estimated coefficients are unbiased estimates of the probit regression for households 
with school-age children, the predicted average probability of attending school will be 
equal to the actual average attendance. Because this estimation provides a key input, but 
is otherwise incidental to our analysis, further descriptions of the methodology and 
estimation results are provided in Appendix 3. 
 
Targeted Groups for Cash Transfers  
With a view toward identifying effective targeting criteria, the study simulates the 
impact of cash transfer programs on poverty and school attendance for children by 
considering the following eligibility categories: (1) a universal scheme targeting all 
school-age children aged 5-18 years [ALL]; a universal scheme for only primary 
school-age children [PRI]; a universal scheme for only secondary school-age children 
[SEC]; a scheme targeting children living in poor households as determined by the 
official poverty measure [POO]; a scheme for children living in the three poorest 
provinces of Uva, Sabaragamuwa, and Central, as based on the poverty headcount ratio 
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[PRO]; schemes for children living in urban [URB] or rural sectors [RUR]; and a 
scheme for children living in households with at least three school-age children [THR].  
 
Determining Effectiveness of the Proposed Cash Transfer Schemes 
Effectiveness of the proposed cash transfer schemes is determined on the basis of how 
the poverty status of children and the whole population, along with the school 
attendance of children, would have changed if a cash transfer scheme had been 
implemented in the past in Sri Lanka. From the perspective of reducing poverty, the 
study calculates how the poverty rate, poverty gap, and poverty severity would have 
changed, in percentage terms. From the perspective of school attendance promotion, the 
study estimates the percentage increase in number of children attending schools together 
with the percentage increase in the probability to attend school by children in cash-
recipient households.  
The potential impact on social welfare is also calculated as the change in utility for 
school-age children and the whole population. To allow for diminishing returns from 
expenditures, changes in utility are computed as the sum of changes in the logarithms of 
expenditures before and after the cash transfer program. The impact on welfare is 
greater for poor households due to their lower starting expenditures. In addition, the cost 
effectiveness of the proposed cash transfer schemes is also computed. Here, the cost 
means the total cost for child benefit payments excluding any administrative costs. The 
cost effectiveness is the percentage of the total cost that would actually have been used 
to reduce the poverty incidence of cash-recipient children, all school-age children, and 
the whole population in Sri Lanka. This analysis provides details about the leakage of 
benefits to non-poor children, to poor non-children, and to non-poor non-children.  
 
Major Assumptions for Simulating Cash Transfer Impacts  
The Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 will be used to simulate the potential impacts of cash 
transfers on poverty and school attendance. This survey provides information on 
expenditures only at the household level, not on an individual basis. As such, we 
assume that cash transfers to eligible households are added to their household 
expenditures and then divided equally among each member of the household. 
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Accordingly, we can expect that the proposed cash transfer schemes would reduce 
poverty incidence among more than just the direct recipients.  
With this assumption, we should note that an aspect of many cash transfer programs is 
that the money is paid to the mother rather than to the father. International evidence 
suggests that benefits are better spent, in terms of children’s health and education, when 
provided to women (see Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Lund et al., 2008). For instance, a 
unique characteristic of the Mexican conditional cash transfer [CCT] program, 
Opportunidades, is the deliberate decision to give the cash transfers to females. 
According to Barber and Gertler (2010), this program improved the quality of prenatal 
care by empowering women to demand their right to quality care.  
A second important assumption is that the proposed cash transfer schemes will be 
implemented with a restricted budget. Initially, we provide simulation results for a 
collection of cash transfer schemes costing approximately 1 per cent of GDP. 
Characteristics of cash transfer programs that we consider include targeting groups, 
maximum eligible age, and benefit level. The impact simulation of cash transfer 
schemes is then performed after varying the budget size between 0.25 per cent and 1.5 
per cent of GDP in 2006/2007. This is considered to be the common range of budget 
allocations for child cash transfer schemes in many developing economies (see 
Barrientos and Dejong, 2004; Son and Florentino, 2008). Under each budget constraint, 
the study finds the most effective cash transfer scheme in terms of poverty reduction, 
welfare improvement, and promotion of school attendance among children.  
As for comparison to existing programs in Sri Lanka, the “Samurdhi” (Prosperity) 
program is considered to be a major cash plus in-kind transfer program dealing with 
poverty reduction and equity objectives in Sri Lanka, accounting for 0.2 per cent of 
GDP (LKR 9298 Million). It benefits 1.6 million families, which amounts to 32 per cent 
of the population (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2009). Among the households that receive 
“Samurdhi,” on average, 14 per cent of total household food expenditure is provided by 
program grants. However, Glinskaya (2000) computes that the program misses almost 
40 per cent of households ranked in the lowest expenditure quintile, while reaching 12 
per cent of the richest expenditure quintile. Meanwhile, for schooling, there is no 
specific cash transfer program targeting school children, but education and 
complementary services are provided for free to Sri Lankan children up to the first 
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degree university level. Government spending on education amounts to between two 
and three per cent of GDP. 
A third assumption is that cash transfer amounts to children are expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line. Per-capita poverty lines range from LKR 1959 to LKR 
2623, depending on the region. The average household expenditures in the survey are 
LKR 23,925, which means that a benefit equal to the poverty line would increase the 
average household's expenditures by between 8.2 and 11 per cent, depending on the 
household's region of residence. For comparison to other countries, Maluccio et al. 
(2010) cites research finding that over the first two years starting in 2000, the actual 
average monetary transfer (for food security and education) of the Nicaraguan Red de 
Protecciόn Social CCT program was approximately $272, or 17 per cent of the total 
annual household expenditures. This is also approximately the same percentage of total 
annual pre-program household expenditures as the average transfer in Mexico's 
Opportunidades CCT program. Thus, a Sri Lankan household with two school-age 
children would be broadly comparable when benefit amounts are close to the poverty 
line. 
Finally, the study assumes that there would not be any behavioural changes among the 
population in ways either to become qualified for benefits or to use benefits as a 
substitute for working. While our simulations are for unconditional transfers, 
behavioural changes that might weaken the program impacts could be mitigated through 
conditionality. Indeed, particularly with regard to school attendance, conditionality 
plays an important role in achieving the intended objectives from CT programs. For 
instance, Colombia’s CCT program, Familias en Acciόn, provides a cash subsidy to 
low-income households with children aged 7-17 on the condition that the child is 
enrolled in school and attends class at least 80 per cent of the time. By calculating 
difference-in-difference estimates, Garcia and Hill (2010) determine that the program 
increased enrolment by 4.6 per cent for rural children and 3.3 per cent for their urban 
counterparts aged 13 to 17, while increasing enrolment by 2.4 percent for younger urban 
children and 2.3 per cent for young rural children aged 7 to 12. The paper also indicates 
that as of 2003, younger children had a 96.3 per cent enrolment rate, compared to 79.6 
per cent for older children, while the overall enrolment rate in urban areas was 88 per 
cent, compared to 75 per cent in rural areas. Meanwhile, Mexico’s primary school 
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enrolment rates before Opportunidades were between 90 and 94 per cent for both boys 
and girls. As explained in Rawlings and Rubio (2005), the increase in enrolment rates 
ranged from 0.74 to 1.07 percentage points for males and from 0.96 to 1.45 percentage 
points for females. Also, the increases in enrolment rates for secondary-level schooling 
range from 3.5 to 5.8 percentage points for males and from 7.2 to 9.3 percentage points 
for females, from the baseline enrolment rates of 73 per cent and 67 per cent for males 
and females, respectively. These studies have provided evidence for the role of 
conditionality in achieving desired objectives.  
Nevertheless, certain studies have concluded that conditionality does not make a 
significant difference in achieving objectives through CT programs. By performing a 
comparative analysis, Lund et al. (2008) argues that the benefits of CT programs are 
reduced by the opportunity cost of fulfilling the conditions for achieving the transfer. 
They recommend that conditionality in CT programs should be justified after a careful 
analysis of the incidence of conditionality on poverty. A Brazilian study (Soares et al., 
2006) compares the poverty reduction effects of unconditional benefits for elderly and 
disabled people with the Brazilian CCT program, Bolsa Escola. They find marked and 
similar effects on poverty reduction from both programs. Because our analysis is ex-
ante for proposed programs, we are unable to directly incorporate conditionality, though 
in our results we will consider how conditionality may impact the findings.   
   
Findings and Discussion    
 
Impacts of the Proposed Cash Transfer Schemes on Poverty 
Poverty among children is higher than for the whole population in Sri Lanka. 
Approximately 17.22 per cent of those aged from five years to 18 years are living below 
the official poverty line, though the same figure for the whole population is 13.53 per 
cent. The poverty gap index and poverty severity index are higher for children as well. 
Appendix 2 provides further details about poverty in Sri Lanka, including a table 
showing the breakdown of poverty for children in different socioeconomic subgroups. 
By assuming a cash transfer of 50 per cent of the official poverty line is provided to 
eligible children (age from five to 18 years), Table 1 presents the estimates in relation to 
total benefits paid, potential impact on poverty, and poverty reduction efficiency. The 
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impacts for different targeting groups in Table 1 are not directly comparable due to their 
differing costs and number of beneficiaries, but later we will compare programs of 
similar cost.  
//Table 1 About Here// 
As shown in Table 1, the total benefits paid would vary from 23.1 billion Sri Lankan 
Rupees (0.71 per cent of GDP in 2006/2007 or US$ 215.3 Million) for a cash transfer 
scheme targeting only poor children, to 135.4 billion Sri Lankan Rupees (4.15 per cent 
of GDP in 2006/2007 or US$ 1,262 Million) for a universal cash transfer scheme 
targeting all children. In our analysis, we have assumed that benefits are added to the 
household expenditures and then divided equally among household members. As a 
result, in most of the proposed cash transfer schemes, more than 50 per cent of 
estimated costs would be spent by non-children. However, lower leakage rates could be 
expected if a cash transfer scheme provides benefits to the children living in households 
consisting at least three school-age children (Category “THR”). Particularly, 56.47 per 
cent of estimated costs would be spent by children in a cash transfer scheme which 
targets such households.  
Moreover, Table 1 provides vital information about the potential reduction in poverty 
rates and the poverty gap for the direct recipients, all school-age children, and the total 
population in Sri Lanka. For instance, a cash transfer scheme providing 50 per cent of 
the poverty line to all school-age children would reduce the poverty rate for children by 
59.57 per cent and for the whole population by 42.94 per cent. After these transfers, the 
resultant poverty rates (ex-post) for children and the whole population would be 6.96 
per cent and 7.72 per cent, respectively.  
In order to compare the cost effectiveness of different proposed cash transfer schemes, 
we use poverty reduction efficiency, which is the percentage of total benefit payments 
that contribute to reducing the poverty gap (Giang and Pfau, 2009). With this criterion, 
a cash transfer scheme providing benefits to the children in poor households would be 
the most effective. Particularly, 29.85 per cent of benefits would contribute to reducing 
the poverty gap for children and 68.1 per cent would contribute to reducing the overall 
poverty gap. A cash transfer scheme targeting the children living in households 
consisting of at least three school-age children would be the second-best cash transfer 
program in terms of poverty reduction efficiency. 
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//Figure 1 About Here// 
For a cash transfer scheme which provides a benefit of 50 per cent of the official 
poverty line to all school-age children, Figure 1 is created to show the resultant costs, 
poverty reduction efficiency, and impact on poverty when varying the maximum 
eligible age. The total costs of the scheme as a percentage of GDP in 2006/2007 grow 
approximately linearly as the maximum eligible age of children increases. The 
percentage of benefits that reduces the poverty gap varies with the maximum eligible 
age. However, it is always less than 7 per cent for children and less than 15 per cent for 
the total population. Poverty reduction efficiency tends to decline when increasing the 
maximum eligible age from 12 to 18 years. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the 
reduction of the poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap for all children and the total 
population as the maximum eligible age of children increases. 
//Figure 2 About Here// 
Figure 2 presents a universal cash transfer scheme for all children (age from five to 18 
years) with the benefit level varying from 5 per cent to 200 per cent of the official 
poverty line. The total costs required for the benefit payment will increase at a linear 
rate as the benefit level increases. The percentage of benefits that contribute to reducing 
the poverty gap for all children and the total population will decline as the benefit level 
increases. Further, the poverty rate and poverty gap for all children and the total 
population will continue to decline as the benefit level increases, but the rate of decline 
slows. In other words, the marginal poverty reduction decreases as the benefit level 
increases, and even a small benefit can have a significant impact on poverty for all 
children as well as the total population.  
Next, Table 2 shows a number of alternatives for a child cash transfer scheme with a 
total cost of approximately 1 per cent of GDP. The table shows the targeting category, 
maximum eligible age of children, and benefit levels of alternative programs together 
with the impacts on the poverty rate, poverty gap index, poverty severity index, and the 
social welfare function for children and the total population.  
//Table 2 About Here// 
As can be observed in Table 2, under any given targeting category, there would be an 
obvious trade off between the eligible maximum age of children and the benefit level 
measured as a percentage of the official poverty line. For example, under the category 
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of poor children, the benefit level could be 88 per cent if the maximum eligible age is 15 
years. However, the benefit level would decrease gradually to 80 per cent, 76 per cent, 
and 70 per cent as the maximum eligible age increases to 16, 17, and 18 years, 
respectively. With a fixed budget, this trade off occurs because a larger number of 
beneficiaries lower the amount of benefits that each beneficiary can receive.  
Among the choices presented, the most effective programs can be selected from the list 
on the basis of the potential impact on poverty measures and welfare for children and 
the total population. For instance, Table 2 shows that a cash transfer scheme providing a 
benefit of 76 per cent of the official poverty line to the poor children aged 5-17 would 
be the most effective in reducing the poverty rate for children and the total population, 
the poverty gap for children, and increasing welfare for both children and the total 
population in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile the cash transfer program providing a benefit of 70 
per cent of the official poverty line to all the poor children would be the most successful 
in terms of reducing the poverty gap of the whole population and reducing the poverty 
severity index for both children and the total population.  
Even though targeting the children from poor households would lead to much greater 
poverty reduction among children and the whole population, policy makers need to 
think of the potentially high administrative cost required to identify poor households. In 
a situation where the administrative costs of identifying the poor becomes unbearable, 
policy makers need to pay attention to other targeting categories. Table 2 also provides 
additional information on the most effective cash transfer scheme in terms of each 
criterion if the category “POO” (Children from poor households) is omitted from the 
analysis. In this case, targeting children in households with at least three school-age 
children would be the most effective in terms of reducing child poverty and improving 
child welfare, while targeting children living in the three poorest provinces would be the 
most effective in reducing poverty and improving welfare among the whole population.  
//Table 3 About Here// 
Table 3 is an extended version of Table 2, because Table 3 incorporates additional total 
spending levels. Generally, targeting poor children would continue to create the best 
results for all of our measures. Table 3 also shows the second-best results if targeting 
poor children is not feasible. Accordingly, targeting the children in households 
consisting of at least three school-age children would be the most effective in reducing 
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poverty and increasing welfare among children across all the spending alternatives. As 
for the whole population, targeting children in the three poorest provinces in Sri Lanka 
would be the most successful for most budget allocations.  
Table 3 also allows us to quantify the diminishing returns to poverty reduction that we 
observed in Figure 2. For example, the most effective cash transfer scheme costing 
about 0.5 per cent of GDP could reduce the child poverty rate by 45.1 per cent. When 
increasing the total costs by 0.5 percentage points to 1 per cent of GDP, the additional 
reduction in the poverty rate for children would be 29.7 percentage points, and an 
additional 0.5 per cent of GDP increase in total costs would further reduce poverty by 
13.8 percentage points. As argued earlier, this implies that even with a limited budget 
for cash transfer schemes, a significant poverty reduction among children and the whole 
population can be expected.  
 
Impacts of the Proposed Cash Transfer Schemes on School Attendance  
Appendix 3 provides extensive details about the determinants of school attendance in 
Sri Lanka. The overall school attendance rate for children aged from five to 18 years is 
84.9 per cent. Further, it is 89.4 per cent for primary school-age children and 82.6 per 
cent for secondary school-age children. Among the determinants, the variable of most 
interest in this study, the log of per-capita expenditures, has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on school attendance at both the primary and secondary levels. This 
implies that the cash transfer programs aimed at school children which increase 
household per-capita expenditures could encourage education participation of children 
at all levels. 
Using the estimates provided in the appendix, Table 4 shows alternatives for a cash 
transfer scheme in Sri Lanka in which the expected spending would be approximately 1 
per cent of GDP in 2006/2007. The characteristics of each alternative shown include the 
targeted category, maximum eligible age of children, and the benefit level as a 
percentage of the official poverty line, as well as the corresponding simulated impact on 
the probability to attend schools for children in cash-recipient households and for 
overall school attendance.  
//Table 4 About Here// 
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The most effective program can be selected from the list on the basis of desired impact 
on school attendance. Table 4 shows that the alternative providing a benefit of 70 per 
cent of the official poverty line to all the children in poor households (Category “POO”) 
with a maximum eligible age of 18 years would be the most effective in promoting 
school attendance for both outcome measures. Particularly, this alternative program 
could increase the probability to attend schools by the children in poor households by 2 
per cent while increasing overall school attendance in Sri Lanka by 0.65 per cent.  
Table 4 also provides additional information in order to facilitate selection of the most 
successful program if targeting the children from poor households is not 
administratively feasible. As a second-best outcome, the alternative providing a benefit 
of 36 per cent of the official poverty line to all the children in households which consist 
of at least three school-age children (Category “THR”) with maximum eligible age of 
18 years would be the most effective, increasing school attendance among children by 
0.54 per cent.  
Generally, for a given total cost, a greater increase in school attendance, in percentage 
terms, occurs with larger maximum eligible ages and lower benefit levels. For instance, 
if we target poor children with a maximum eligible age of 15 years, the program could 
increase school attendance by 0.38 per cent. However, if we gradually increase the 
maximum eligible age up to 16, 17, and 18 years, the simulated increase in school 
attendance would be 0.48 per cent, 0.59 per cent, and 0.65 per cent, respectively, despite 
falling benefits. In sum, this implies that it would be better to increase the maximum 
eligible age of children and reduce the benefit level for any given program cost. 
//Table 5 About Here// 
Table 5 provides the results of the best program for promoting school attendance as the 
budget size varies. We observe that targeting poor children provides robust results 
across spending levels. If these cash transfer programs had been implemented under the 
alternative budget allocations of 0.25 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 1 per cent, 1.25 per cent, 
and 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2006/2007, the corresponding percentage increases in school 
attendance would have been 0.2 per cent, 0.37 per cent, 0.65 per cent, 0.78 per cent, and 
0.89 per cent, respectively. As a second-best result, targeting households with three or 
more school-age children is also robust, except for the 1.5 per cent spending level where 
targeting children in the three poorest provinces is most successful. As with poverty 
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reduction, the marginal increase in school attendance declines with increasing 
expenditures.   
 These estimates for the increase in school attendance can be thought of as lower 
bounds if benefit receipt were to include conditions for school attendance. Such 
requirements would reduce the opportunity costs of schooling, especially at the 
secondary level. Though initial enrolment rates vary across countries, the earlier 
discussion of CCT programs suggests that for a country with the initial enrolment rates 
of Sri Lanka, conditionality may increase attendance by several percentage points. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we use the Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 to perform an ex-ante evaluation of 
unconditional cash transfer schemes for children. We find that targeting the children in 
poor households would be the most effective in terms of reducing poverty among 
children and the whole population and increasing school attendance. Universal schemes 
generally do not provide such favourable results. This finding is robust across various 
spending levels. In a situation where targeting only poor children becomes impossible, 
targeting the children in households which consist of at least three school-age children 
would generate the best results for improving the social welfare of children and the rate 
of school attendance. This finding is also quite robust. Further, we found that even with 
a small budget allocation and small benefit level, we can expect a significant reduction 
in poverty among children and the whole population, and a noticeable increase in school 
attendance. We determine that it would be better to increase the maximum eligible age 
of children and reduce benefit levels for any given scheme and cost in order to produce 
a bigger impact on poverty and schooling.  
A number of issues in relation to child cash transfers, poverty reduction, and school 
enrolment can be addressed in future research. For instance, future research needs to 
address the issue of how to manage the system with reasonable costs through which 
cash transfers are provided. Further, providing cash transfers may result in changing 
behaviour for children and adults, and it is important to explore the real behavioural 
changes that may occur among household members in response to cash transfers. White 
(2009) argues that undertaking adequate qualitative field work (“development tourism”) 
before moving to the quantitative analysis enables evaluators to better design ex-ante 
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impact studies and do sensible quantitative analyses. Such additional analysis for 
subsequent research can help to determine potential behavioural responses, as well as to 
help determine appropriate conditions for benefit receipt.  
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Table 1: Estimated Impacts of the Proposed Cash Transfer Schemes. A Cash Transfer of 50 Per cent of the Poverty Line provided to 
Eligible Children Aged from Five to 18 years.  
Indicators ALL PRI SEC POO PRO URB RUR THR 
Total Benefits Paid (LKR billion) 135.40 47.10 88.20 23.10 38.10 36.60 98.80 45.80 
As a Per cent of GDP 4.15 1.45 2.71 0.71 1.17 1.12 3.03 1.41 
% Spent by Recipients 43.32 27.50 37.72 45.80 44.03 42.98 43.45 56.47 
% Spent by School-Age Children 43.32 40.66 44.75 45.80 44.03 42.98 43.45 56.47 
% Spent by Non-Children 56.68 59.34 55.25 54.20 55.97 57.02 56.55 43.53 
 
Direct Recipients 
        
Ex-Ante Poverty Rate (%) 17.22 17.70 16.97 100.00 27.92 7.68 20.65 26.67 
Ex-Post Poverty Rate (%) 6.96 11.00 8.06 40.43 12.72 2.77 8.47 8.65 
% Change Poverty Rate -59.57 -37.84 -52.51 -59.57 -54.45 -63.92 -58.99 -67.56 
Ex-Ante Poverty Gap Index 3.50 3.80 3.40 20.60 6.30 1.40 4.30 5.90 
Ex-Post Poverty Gap Index 1.00 1.90 1.20 5.70 1.90 0.40 1.20 1.20 
% Change Poverty Gap Index -72.40 -49.42 -65.00 -72.40 -69.70 -73.38 -72.29 -80.22 
School-Age Children         
Ex-Ante Poverty Rate (%) 17.22 17.22 17.22 17.22 17.22 17.22 17.22 17.22 
Ex-Post Poverty Rate (%) 6.96 13.52 10.11 6.96 12.83 15.92 8.26 11.15 
% Change Poverty Rate -59.57 -21.52 -41.31 -59.57 -25.50 -7.54 -52.04 -35.26 
Ex-Ante Poverty Gap Index 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Ex-Post Poverty Gap Index 1.00 2.50 1.70 1.00 2.30 3.30 1.30 2.00 
% Change Poverty Gap Index -72.40 -29.72 -51.79 -72.40 -36.03 -7.68 -64.73 -44.64 
Total Population         
Ex-Ante Poverty Rate (%) 13.53 13.53 13.53 13.53 13.53 13.53 13.53 13.53 
Ex-Post Poverty Rate (%) 7.72 11.31 9.65 7.72 11.05 12.70 8.54 10.78 
% Change Poverty Rate -42.94 -16.39 -28.67 -42.94 -18.28 -6.08 -36.86 -20.29 
Ex-Ante Poverty Gap Index 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 
Ex-Post Poverty Gap Index 1.20 2.00 1.70 1.20 1.90 2.50 1.40 1.90 
% Change Poverty Gap Index -55.21 -23.33 -37.48 -55.21 -27.37 -6.35 -48.86 -27.23 
 
Poverty Reduction Efficiency (Percentage of Total Cost that Reduces Poverty Gap) 
Recipients -5.10 -3.68 -4.42 -29.85 -8.86 -2.04 -6.23 -9.31 
Children -5.10 -6.01 -5.59 -29.85 -8.86 -2.04 -6.23 -9.31 
Total Population -11.63 -14.11 -12.11 -68.10 -20.14 -5.05 -14.06 -17.01 
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
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Table 2:  Cash Transfer Schemes Costing approximately 1 Per cent of GDP in 2006/2007 (LKR 32.6 billion or US$ 303.7 million) 
Characteristics of Cash Transfer Scheme 
 
∆  in Poverty 
Headcount Ratio 
(%) 
∆ in Poverty Gap 
Index (%) 
∆ in Poverty Severity 
Index (%) 
Impact on Social Welfare 
Function (%) 
 
Cat Max 
Age 
Benefit Level 
 (As a % of official poverty line) 
Children All Children All Children All Children All 
POO 15 88 -72.34 -52.87 -83.17 -64.51 -88.81 -71.79 0.72 0.39 
POO 16 80 -72.61 -53.03 -83.46 -64.69 -89.40 -72.18 0.72 0.39 
POO 17 76 -74.77 -54.64 -84.91 -65.96 -90.43 -73.21 0.73 0.40 
POO 18 70 -74.13 -54.21 -84.78 -66.03 -90.61 -73.54 0.72 0.39 
PRO 13 68 -21.61 -15.84 -32.03 -24.57 -38.31 -30.20 0.48 0.27 
PRO 14 62 -22.10 -16.03 -33.13 -25.29 -39.77 -31.29 0.50 0.28 
PRO 15 54 -21.91 -15.78 -32.89 -24.86 -39.70 -31.00 0.49 0.27 
PRO 16 50 -22.49 -16.03 -33.32 -25.09 -40.08 -31.23 0.50 0.27 
PRO 17 46 -22.52 -15.92 -32.91 -24.74 -39.80 -30.98 0.50 0.27 
THR 14 50 -25.17 -14.62 -36.66 -22.28 -44.87 -28.40 0.59 0.26 
THR 15 44 -25.65 -14.78 -36.43 -22.15 -44.52 -28.19 0.58 0.26 
THR 18 36 -26.11 -15.14 -36.97 -22.41 -44.83 -28.29 0.60 0.26 
RUR 08 58 -16.32 -12.63 -23.91 -18.73 -30.19 -24.39 0.40 0.24 
RUR 13 26 -20.52 -14.79 -29.48 -21.73 -37.36 -28.49 0.45 0.25 
URB 15 58 -6.75 -5.45 -7.12 -5.84 -7.54 -6.42 0.31 0.18 
URB 16 52 -6.78 -5.34 -7.00 -5.70 -7.42 -6.26 0.30 0.17 
PRI 05 170 -10.06 -8.06 -12.24 -9.92 -14.26 -11.58 0.32 0.20 
PRI 07 56 -12.52 -9.71 -19.33 -15.44 -24.32 -19.96 0.36 0.22 
SEC 10 170 -14.19 -9.71 -17.86 -12.61 -21.19 -15.42 0.40 0.22 
SEC 15 28 -18.02 -12.00 -25.58 -17.92 -32.38 -23.33 0.45 0.24 
ALL 05 170 -10.06 -8.06 -12.24 -9.92 -14.26 -11.58 0.32 0.20 
ALL 18 12 -16.17 -11.48 -24.27 -17.86 -31.02 -23.46 0.42 0.23 
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007  
Note: The entries printed in bold letters show the best performance for each criterion and the parameters of their associated cash transfer programs. The entries 
printed in bold italic letters show the second-best performance for each criterion and the parameters of the relevant cash transfer programs if targeting poor children 
is impossible due to administrative difficulties. 
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Table 3:  The Most Effective Child Cash Transfer Scheme under Different Budget Levels  
Characteristics of Cash Transfer Scheme ∆  in Poverty 
Headcount Ratio (%) 
∆ in Poverty Gap 
Index (%) 
∆ in Poverty 
Severity Index (%) 
Impact on Social 
Welfare Function (%) 
Total Cost 
as % of GDP 
in 2006/2007 
Cat 
  
Max 
Age 
 
Benefit Level 
as a % of 
official 
Poverty Line 
Children
 
All
 
Children
 
All
 
Children
 
All
 
Children All 
0.25 POO 18 18 -24.80 -17.67 -34.61 -25.58 -43.18  0.21  
POO 11 36      -32.99  0.12 
PRO 13 18  -4.64  -8.57    0.08 
PRO 12 20      -11.95   
THR 17 10   -12.34  -16.94  0.17  
THR 06 84 -7.78        
 
0.50 POO 18 36 -45.08 -32.46 -59.18 -44.47 -69.12 -53.89 0.40 0.22 
PRO 15 28    -15.09  -20.31  0.15 
PRO 10 52  -9.01       
THR 18 18 -14.32  -21.88  -28.61  0.31  
 
1.00 POO 18 70    -66.03 -90.61 -73.54   
POO 17 76 -74.77 -54.64 -84.91    0.73 0.40 
PRO 14 62    -25.29  -31.29  0.28 
PRO 12 78  -16.45       
THR 18 36   -36.97  -44.83  0.60  
THR 17 38 -26.26        
 
1.50 POO 18 105 -88.60 -66.74 -94.42 -76.01 -96.85 -80.85 0.99 0.55 
PRO 18 64        0.39 
PRO 15 82    -31.74     
PRO 14 92  -22.55       
RUR 12 44      -38.39   
THR 13 86 -34.50  -44.82  -51.30  0.85  
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
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Figure 1: Varying the Maximum Eligible Age for a Universal Cash Transfer Scheme 
with Benefits of 50 Per cent of the Official Poverty Line for the Children Aged from 
five to 18 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
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Figure 2: Varying the Benefit Level for a Universal Cash Transfer Scheme with 
Benefits for All Children Aged from five to 18 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
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Table 4: Choices for the Cash Transfer Program Costing Approximately 1 Per cent of 
GDP in 2006/2007 (LKR 32.6 billion or US$ 303.7 million) 
Cat Max 
Age 
Benefit Level as a 
Percentage of Official 
Poverty Line 
Estimated 
Percentage Change 
in Probability of 
Attending School for 
Recipients 
Estimated Percentage Change in 
Overall School Attendance 
ALL 18 12 0.19 0.37 
ALL 16 14 0.15 0.26 
ALL 07 56 0.24 0.10 
     
PRI 07 56 0.24 0.10 
PRI 06 84 0.52 0.13 
PRI 05 170 2.00 0.19 
     
SEC 15 28 0.21 0.21 
SEC 14 34 0.17 0.14 
SEC 13 42 0.13 0.09 
     
PRO 17 46 0.70 0.39 
PRO 16 50 0.61 0.32 
PRO 15 54 0.50 0.24 
     
POO 18 70 2.00 0.65 
POO 17 76 1.83 0.59 
POO 16 80 1.54 0.48 
POO 15 88 1.27 0.38 
   
 
 
THR 18 36 0.80 0.54 
THR 17 38 0.72 0.47 
THR 15 44 0.49 0.28 
THR 14 50 0.40 0.21 
     
URB 18 44 0.48 0.25 
URB 17 48 0.41 0.21 
     
RUR 13 26 0.13 0.13 
RUR 07 78 0.36 0.11 
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
Note: The entries printed in bold letters show the best overall performances. The entries printed in italic 
letters show the second-best performance when targeting poor children is impossible due to 
administrative difficulties. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on School Attendance: Results for the 
Best Program Under Varying Budget Levels 
Total Cost as 
a Percentage 
of GDP 
2006/2007 
Cat Maximum 
Age 
Benefit Level as a 
Percentage of 
Official Poverty 
Line 
Estimated 
Percentage Change 
in Probability of 
Attending School 
for Recipients 
Estimated Percentage 
Change in School 
Attendance 
0.25 POO 18 18 0.60 0.20 
 
THR 17 10 0.20 0.13 
 
0.50 POO 18 36 1.13 0.37 
 
THR 18 18 0.42 0.29 
 
1.00 POO 18 70 2.00 0.65 
 
THR 18 36 0.80 0.54 
 
1.25 POO 18 88 2.37 0.78 
 
THR 18 44 0.96 0.65 
 
1.50 POO 18 105 2.72 0.89 
 
PRO 18 64 1.12 0.63 
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007  
 
Note: The entries printed in bold letters show the best overall performances. The entries printed in italic 
letters show the second-best performance where targeting poor children is impossible due to 
administrative difficulties. 
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Appendix 1. Data Description 
 
The Sri Lanka Household Income and Expenditure Survey [Sri Lanka HIES] 2006/2007 
covers all the districts in Sri Lanka except the Northern Province and Trincomalee 
district in the Eastern Province. According to the DCS (2008), the data were collected 
through direct personal interviews using a schedule consisting of sections of 
demographic characteristics, health, education, household expenditures, and household 
income. Some information is available at the individual level, while other data are 
available only at the household level. For instance, the data on demography, schooling 
health, and income earned from various sources are collected and recorded at the 
individual level. However, the data on expenditures, inventory of durable goods, debts, 
basic facilities, and housing are available only at the household level. The survey 
captures information for 76,723 individuals from 18,544 households in Sri Lanka. 
Among these are 19,104 school-age children (age from five years to 18 years) of whom 
6,644 are of primary school age (age from five years to nine years) and 12,460 are of 
secondary school age (age from 10 years to 18 years).  
 
Appendix 2. Details on Poverty Measures and Poverty in Sri Lanka 
 
The official poverty line in Sri Lanka is a combination of the food poverty line and non-
food poverty line. The food poverty line in 2002 (base year) is defined at LKR 973 per-
capita per-month by multiplying per-calorie cost with the nutritional anchor per month. 
The per-capita per-day calorie requirement in 2002 was computed to be 2030 Kcal.  
The lower and upper bounds of the official poverty line are calculated by adding the 
lower and upper bounds of the non-food component of the poverty line to the aforesaid 
food poverty line. The official poverty line is the arithmetic mean of these lower and 
upper bounds. Accordingly, the official poverty line in Sri Lanka in 2002 was computed 
to be LKR 1423 per-capita per-month. District level official poverty lines in 2006/2007 
are derived by adjusting for price differences over time and across districts using the 
monthly Colombo Consumer Price Index (CCPI) from June 2006 to December 2007 
and Spatial Price Indices computed for each district. Official poverty lines in Sri Lanka 
 28
are computed by the Department of Census and Statistics, and they range from LKR 
1959 to LKR 2623 on a per-capita basis across regions. 
Regarding the FGT poverty measures, the poverty headcount ratio is the proportion of 
the population whose per-capita expenditures are below their official poverty line. The 
poverty gap index measures the extent to which household expenditures fall below the 
poverty line (it is zero for the non-poor), and the total poverty gap indicates the total 
amount of expenditures necessary to remove all people from poverty. Poverty severity 
puts extra weight on those experiencing more extreme poverty by averaging the squares 
of the poverty gap index values. 
Table A1 presents the poverty status for children in Sri Lanka. Among children (age 
from five years to 18 years), approximately 17.22 per cent are living below the official 
poverty line, though the same figure for the whole population is 13.53 per cent. The 
poverty gap index and poverty severity index are higher for children as well.  
//Table A1 About Here// 
The poverty status among children varies across socio-economic subgroups including 
ethnicity, living area in terms of urban-rural division and provincial division, and 
whether the child attends school. As can be observed in Table A1, when compared with 
the children of other ethnicities, Tamil children are considerably poorer. Approximately 
27.34 per cent of Tamil children are living below the official poverty line, while the 
matching figure for children in the Sinhala ethnic group is 15.55 per cent. In addition, 
poverty among children living in rural areas is far higher than that among urban children. 
The poverty headcount index for rural children is approximately 2.68 times higher than 
their urban counterparts. Across provinces, the Sabaragamuwa province reports the 
highest child poverty headcount ratio, with more than one-third of children living in 
poverty. Poverty among children not attending school is higher as well, as such children 
experience a poverty rate of about 22.1 per cent, compared to 16.4 per cent for children 
in school.  
 
Appendix 3. Determinants of School Attendance 
 
In order to explore the determinants of school attendance, we estimate the probit 
regression model: 
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In Equation A1, iPCE is the per-capita expenditure per month of child i’s household, 
and it is removed from iΗ to emphasize its importance. The variable iattend is a binary 
variable which takes one when a child attends school and zero when a child does not 
attend school. The parameter of interest isα , which shows the impact of per-capita 
expenditures on the school attendance of children. We specifically seek the marginal 
effect of iPCE  on iattend  as follows: 
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where (.)φ is the standard normal distribution.  
We can simulate the average difference in probability to attend school ( Pr∆ ) for any 
cash transfer program as follows:  
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Where epc~  and pce  are per-capita expenditures before and after the cash transfer 
scheme and X  is the vector of other explanatory variables except per-capita 
expenditures. The difference between pce  and epc~  is the added per-capita 
expenditures from the cash transfer programs. Equation A3 computes the impact on the 
probability of attending school as a result of implementing cash transfer schemes while 
holding other explanatory variables unchanged. Meanwhile, the number of children 
starting school after implementation of a cash transfer program is computed as follows: 
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Where i represents each school-age child under each cash transfer program. The 
increase in school attendance is calculated as a percentage of the number of actual 
school attendees.  
Before providing the probit model estimates, we will first describe the general 
background for school enrolment in Sri Lanka. The public sector of Sri Lanka is 
operating a system for formal education through a nation-wide network of 
approximately 10,000 public schools, in which approximately 3.9 million pupils are 
studying at the primary and secondary levels. More than 99 per cent of the schools are 
public schools, leaving a minor role for the private sector. Since the free education 
legislation of 1945, education has been free up to the first degree university level.  
However, in spite of the large sums spent by the government, Sri Lanka has not 
achieved universal school enrolment for children aged from five to 18 years. As shown 
in Table A2, the school attendance rate for children aged from five to 18 years is 84.9 
per cent. Further, it is 89.4 per cent for primary school-age children and 82.6 per cent 
for secondary school-age children. Table A2 also shows that school attendance rates 
vary across socio-economic subgroups in terms of gender, ethnicity, sector, poverty 
status, province, and age.  
//Table A2 About Here// 
Females and urban children are slightly more likely to attend schools. The Tamil ethnic 
group and poor households are found to be less likely to send children to school. There 
are also some differences across provinces. The rate of school attendance also differs 
depending on the age of children. The pattern in the percentage of children not attending 
schools by age exhibits a U-shape curve, as the percentage of children not attending 
schools falls from five to seven years, is steady at a low level between eight and 11 
years, and rises sharply afterward.  
Now we consider the determinants of school attendance at the levels of overall 
schooling, primary schooling, and secondary schooling. The descriptions and the mean 
values of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table A3. 
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//Table A3 About Here// 
The results of a link test show that the models are correctly specified for the primary 
and secondary schooling equations, though a specification problem arises in the overall 
schooling equation. The Link test is used after probit estimation to examine whether the 
model is properly specified. In our models, “_hat” is significant for all cases. However, 
“_hatsq” is significant for the overall schooling model (P-value=0.00), while it is not 
significant for the primary and secondary schooling models (P-values are 0.12 and 0.68, 
respectively). This means that the overall schooling model has some specification errors. 
Moreover, Chow test results show that the impacts of explanatory variables on school 
attendance are different for primary and secondary schooling. The Chow test examines 
whether parameters for one group are different from those of another group. The null 
hypothesis that the parameters are the same is tested with the pooled dataset. The 
computed F-statistic for the test is 51.94. Since the corresponding critical value of F is 
1.57, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent significance level in favour of two 
separate estimations for primary and secondary school. Thus, there is no reason to 
assume that both levels of schooling have the same coefficients for their explanatory 
variables. Accordingly, this explains why we estimate the determinants of school 
attendance separately for primary school-age children and for secondary school-age 
children.   
The empirical results for the determinants of school attendance are reported in Table A4. 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of results, the marginal impacts are shown 
together with the corresponding robust standard errors.  
//Table A4 About Here// 
As can be observed, significant characteristics that increase the probability of schooling 
include being female, younger, the child of the household head, a Sinhala ethnic group 
member, and having an older and more educated household head who does not work as 
a salaried employee. Surprisingly, household location (urban or rural) and composition 
in terms of number of elderly dependents and children are not important. The variable 
of most interest in this study, the log of per-capita expenditures, has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on school attendance at both schooling levels. 
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Table A1: Poverty Status of School-Age Children 
 Percentage 
of Total 
School-Age 
Children 
(%) 
Poverty 
Headcount 
Index (%) 
Poverty Gap 
Index  
Poverty 
Severity 
Index  
School Children 
 
100.00 17.22 3.55 1.10 
Gender Male 49.99 16.83 3.38 1.03 
 
 
Female 50.01 17.62 3.71 1.18 
Ethnicity Sinhala 69.37 15.55* 3.16 0.97 
 
Tamil 16.62 27.34* 6.15 2.01 
 
 
Other 14.01 13.49* 2.38 0.69 
Sector Urban 26.44 7.68* 1.40 0.40 
 
 
Rural 73.56 20.65* 4.32 1.36 
Province Western 25.80 9.00* 1.72 0.50 
 
Central 12.47 21.61* 4.59 1.38 
 
Southern 19.80 14.20* 2.58 0.72 
 
Eastern 9.50 14.66* 2.60 0.72 
 
North Western 9.78 16.10* 2.93 0.90 
 
North Central 6.24 16.86* 3.53 1.11 
 
Uva 8.18 31.09* 7.64 2.77 
 
 
Sabaragamuwa 8.23 34.33* 7.72 2.53 
Age Group Primary (5-9) 34.78 17.70 3.77 1.19 
 
Secondary(10-18) 65.22 16.97 3.43 1.06 
 
Status of 
Schooling 
Attending 
Not Attending 
84.95 
15.05 
16.40* 
22.10* 
3.33 
4.76 
1.02 
1.57 
 
     
Sample Size  
 
19,104    
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
 
Note: Official district poverty lines have been used for determining poverty status. Poverty measures are 
calculated using the official per-capita expenditure equivalence scale. According to our calculations, the 
headcount ratio, poverty gap index, and poverty severity index for Sri Lanka at the national level are 
13.53 per cent, 2.65, and 0.80, respectively.  
*: Significant difference among subgroup categories at 5 per cent level   
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Table A2: Percentage of Children Attending School for Key Characteristics 
 Overall 
Schooling 
185 ≤≤ age  
Primary 
Schooling 
95 ≤≤ age  
Secondary 
Schooling 
1810 ≤≤ age  
Sri Lanka  84.9 89.4 82.6 
 
Gender Male 84.4* 89.1 81.9* 
 
 
Female 85.5* 89.6 83.3* 
Ethnicity Sinhala 86.7* 90.1* 84.9* 
 
Tamil 78.4* 85.5* 74.6* 
 
 
Other 84.0* 90.3* 80.2* 
Sector Urban 85.8* 90.2 83.6 
 
 
Rural 84.6* 89.1 82.2 
Poverty Status Poor Households 80.7* 87.6* 76.9* 
 
 
Non-poor Households 85.8* 89.7* 83.8* 
Province Western 85.1* 90.4* 82.1* 
 
Central 85.5* 86.6* 84.9* 
 
Southern 85.8* 89.9* 83.6* 
 
Eastern 84.8* 91.0* 81.4* 
 
North Western 83.1* 87.9* 80.4* 
 
North Central 87.8* 91.4* 86.0* 
 
Uva 85.3* 90.2* 82.9* 
 
Sabaragamuwa 81.6* 86.6* 79.3* 
 
    
Age (in years) 5  52.4*  
 
6  97.8*  
 
7  99.0*  
 
8  98.6*  
 
9  99.5*  
 
10   98.9* 
 
11   98.3* 
 
12   97.6* 
 
13   96.9* 
 
14   94.4* 
 
15   89.1* 
 
16   69.1* 
 
17   55.4* 
 
18   42.8* 
 
 
Sample Size 19,104    
Source: Own calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
 
*: Significant difference among subgroup categories at 5 per cent level 
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Table A3: Descriptions for Variables 
Variable Description Mean 
attend If an school-age child is attending school=1, otherwise=0 
 
0.85 
gender Gender of  individuals (Male=1 Female=0) 0.50 
age Age of individuals in years  
 
11.56 
age_sq (age-mean age)^2 
 
16.22 
child_of hhh Biological relationship to the household head (Child of 
household head=1, otherwise=0) 
 
0.82 
ethnic_sinhala Ethnicity of individual is Sinhala=1, otherwise=0 
 
0.69 
ethnic_tamil Ethnicity of individual is Tamil=1, otherwise=0 0.17 
ethnic_other 
 
Ethnicity of individual is neither Sinhala nor Tamil=1, 
otherwise=0 
 
0.14 
head_age Age of household head in years 46.97 
head_age_sq (head_age-mean of head_age)^2 
 
131.43 
head_gender  Gender of household head (Male=1, Female=0) 0.80 
hh_primary 
 
Household head is schooled only up to primary level=1, 
otherwise=0 
 
0.30 
hh_secondary_and_above Household head’s level of education is secondary level or 
more=1, otherwise=0 
 
0.65 
hh_no_sch 
 
Household head has no schooling=1, otherwise=0 
 
0.06 
hh_emp_formal Household head is employed in the formal sector=1, 
otherwise=0 
 
0.52 
hh_emp_informal Household head is employed in the informal sector=1, 
otherwise=0 
 
0.46 
hh_emp_employer 
 
Household head is an employer=1, otherwise=0 
 
0.03 
sector  urban=1, rural=0 
 
0.26 
no_elderly_dependents Number of people in each household whose age is 65 or above 
 
0.21 
no_children 
 
Number of people in each household whose age is 18 or below 
 
2.55 
livelihood_emp Household’s main livelihood is salaried employment=1, 
otherwise=0 
 
0.50 
livelihood_agri Household’s main livelihood is agriculture=1, otherwise=0 
 
0.16 
livelihood_other 
 
Household’s main livelihood is neither employment nor 
agriculture=1, otherwise=0 
 
0.34 
pce Per-capita expenditure per month in Sri Lankan Rupees 5150.05 
 
ln_pce Natural logarithm of “pce” 8.30 
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
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Table A4: School Attendance at Overall, Primary, and Secondary Schooling Levels 
(Marginal Effects from the Probit Regression) 
Variable Overall 
Schooling 
Primary 
Schooling 
Secondary 
Schooling 
 
gender (M=1, F=0) -0.01*** -0.0004 -0.02*** 
 
 (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0047) 
 
age -0.01*** -0.17*** -0.04*** 
 
 (0.0005) (0.01) (0.0031) 
 
age_sq -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.0037*** 
 
 (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
 
child_of_hhh 0.07*** 0.02* 0.07*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnicity ethnic_sinhala 0.04*** -0.0013 0.06*** 
[Base 
ethnic_others] 
 (0.01) (0.0050) (0.01) 
 
ethnic_tamil -0.01 -0.02** 0.01 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
 
head_age 0.0022*** 0.0006** 0.0027*** 
 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
 
head_age_sq -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
head_gender (M=1 F=0) 0.0039 -0.0021 0.01 
 
 (0.01) (0.0045) (0.01) 
Household hh_primary 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
Head’s Education  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
[Base hh_no_sch] hh_secondary_and_above 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.11*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Head’s hh_emp_formal 0.03* 0.02* 0.02 
Employment  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
[Base 
hh_emp_employer] 
hh_emp_informal 0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
 
sector (urban=1 rural=0) 0.01 0.0016 0.01 
 
 (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.01) 
 
no_elderly_dependents 0.0030 0.0009 0.01 
 
 (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.01) 
 
no_children 0.0019 -0.0006 0.0031 
 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0021) 
Main Livelihood of  livelihood_emp -0.02** -0.0003 -0.02*** 
Household   (0.01) (0.0047) (0.01) 
[Base 
livelihood_other] 
livelihood_agri 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.0016 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 ln_pce 0.03*** 0.01** 0.05*** 
  (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0049) 
 
 
Log likelihood -5322.19 -1264.50 -3668.91 
 
Sample Size 19,104 6,644 12,460 
Source: Own Calculations based on Sri Lanka HIES 2006/2007 
 
Note: *** indicates 0.1 per cent significant level; **indicates 1 per cent significant level; * indicates 5 per 
cent significant level. Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses.   
  
 
